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1 Introduction
This paper attempts to study a natural but perhaps under-explored connection between
the imperfect capital market and the real estate market. An emerging literature indicates
that the real estate market is closely related to the business cycles (Greenwood and Her-
cowitz, 1991; Iacoviello, 2005; Jin and Zeng, 2004; Leung, 2004). It is also well known
that the imperfect capital market plays an important role in the propagation of shocks
over the business cycles (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist,
1999; Hubbard, 1998). Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that the imperfect capital
market may also be related to the housing market. To explore this possibility, this paper
follows the literature in employing the external finance premium (EFP) as a measure of
the changing conditions of the credit market. Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p.28) define
the EFP as “the diﬀerence in cost between funds raised externally and funds generated
internally.” It is regarded as a key indicator of the extent of credit market imperfections
in the literature (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999 (henceforth BGG); Carlstrom
and Fuerst, 1997; and Fisher, 1999). In practice, borrowers may default, and lenders will
charge a premium on the debt contract, and thus the EFP naturally arises. As BGG are
pioneers of modeling the EFP in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, this paper extends
the model of BGG to include the real estate market.
To investigate the possible linkage between the capital market imperfection (proxied
by the EFP) and the real estate market more formally, we will run a vector autoregression
( ).1 A merit of VAR is that it allows the variables to interact with one another in
1Among others, see Sims (1980) for more discussion on this point.
a dynamic manner. In particular, our VAR model contains the variables of the log of
real GDP (), the log of real OFHEO price ()2, the external finance premium
( ), which is computed as the prime bank lending rate minus the 3-month T-bill
rate and expressed in percentage points, and the log of real nonresidential investment
(), all of them are calculated on quarterly figures. Limited by the data availability,
the sample period is from 1975Q1 to 2008Q2. We use a simple short-run recursiveness
identification scheme to identify the impulse responses to structural disturbances (see
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999). As our results are robust against the ordering
of these variables in the  , we present results based on the ordering of , ,
 , and . The number of lags is set to 4 according to the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The impulse responses are
presented in Figure 1. First, a positive shock to real GDP drives real house prices and
nonresidential investment up. At the same time, it drives the external finance premium
down, corroborating the previous finding in the literature of the countercyclicality of
 . Second, a positive real house price shock lowers the external finance premium
and stimulates nonresidential investment and real GDP, though the eﬀect on  is not
statistically significant. This suggests that an under-explored linkage between the EFP and
the housing market may nevertheless be worth further investigation. Third, an unexpected
increase in the EFP would depress the real GDP without having a significant impact on
house prices. Combining the second and the third results suggests that the causality is
more likely to be from the housing market to the capital market, rather than the other way
2The nominal OFHEO prices are deflated by NIPA’s implicit price deflator for personal consumption
expenditure.
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round. Finally, a positive shock to nonresidential investment raises the external finance
premium, presumably through making firms more financially leveraged.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
These results are consistent with the view that real estate contributes significantly to
business financing in general. As recognized by Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001, p.728),
“In the United States, approximately 40% of the small business loans and almost 60% of
their value are guaranteed and/or secured with personal assets... Collateral requirements
are even larger for small business in developing countries and in backward regions of
developed economies.” Accordingly, this paper will study how real estate prices interact
with the external finance premium, business investment, and the aggregate economy.
In addition, this paper will explicitly introduce corporate real estate (CRE) into an oth-
erwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE). The significance
of real estate as a share of the total assets of corporations has long been discussed. For
instance, Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983) estimate that corporate real estate constitutes
between 25-40% of the total assets of firms on average. Later studies have confirmed this
finding (Veale, 1989; Liow, 1995; Du et al., 2008; Dong et al., 2010) Interestingly, CRE is
absent in most, if not all of the DSGE models. In this paper, CRE plays an important
role as it is both production and collateral against which firms can borrow from the banks.
In practice, although the value of CRE is typically not perfectly correlated with firm per-
formance, banks welcome such asset as collateral and lend greater amount to firms than
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they would in the absence of CRE. Unfortunately, there is a drawback. When the value
of CRE declines along with the economy, debt capacity also shrinks. This clearly aﬀects
investment at the firm level and, eventually, at the aggregate level. Thus, introducing
CRE into a DSGE model provides an additional propagation mechanism to link together
the real estate market and the aggregate economy.
This paper is closely related to the emerging literature on housing and the macro-
economy. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) study the turbulent United Kingdom housing
market. Del Negro and Otrok (2007) confirm the recent increase in the importance of
housing to the U.S. economy. Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) study the role of monetary
policy shocks in house price fluctuations in Finland, Sweden and the UK. They find that
the response of house prices to interest rate surprises is greater and more persistent in
periods characterized by more liberalized financial markets. Iacoviello and Minetti (2008)
employ a VAR approach to analyze the housing markets of Finland, Germany, Norway
and the UK. They show a clear-cut relationship across the four countries between the
presence of credit channels, the eﬃciency of housing finance, and the type of institutions
active in mortgage provision. Almeida, Campello and Liu (2006) present cross-country
evidence that diﬀerences in lending policies, such as the loan-to-value ratio, can aﬀect the
economy’s sensitivity to monetary policy or income shocks. Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh
(2005) find empirically that the value premium in the financial market varies systemat-
ically with the level of housing collateral in the economy. This paper complements the
literature by formulating a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model which explicitly
links the imperfect capital market faced by firms (measured by the EFP), the house prices
faced by the households, and the aggregate economy.
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This paper is also related to a large literature on the house price dynamics, and how
it is related to the market fundamentals, including Andrew and Meen (2003), Capozza,
Hendershott and Mack (2004), Clapp, Dolde and Tirtiroglu (1995), Clayton (1996), Gallin
(2006), among others. This paper builds on their insights and build a DSGE model where
the house price dynamics, as well as its relationship with the economic fundamentals are
all determined at the equilibrium endogenously.
The organization of this paper is straightforward. The next section presents the model.
Diﬀerent agents in the model are then explained sequentially. The calibration section
explains how the parameter values are assigned. This is followed by the quantitative
results and a number of robustness checks. The final section concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Our model builds on the work of BGG and extends it to include corporate and residential
real estate. Due to the similarities of the two models and the limited space available, we
will provide a brief outline of our model. Once again, it is a dynamic, stochastic general
equilibrium model (DSGE), with credit market imperfections. Time is discrete and the
horizon is infinite. There are three types of agents in this economy, households, entrepre-
neurs, and financial intermediaries. Households work, consume, purchase houses, and save.
Their savings are directed to entrepreneurs via financial intermediaries. Loan contracts
are signed between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries to finance entrepreneurial
investment, in a way that compensates for default risks. In these contracts entrepreneurial
assets, including productive capital and corporate real estate, serve as collateral.
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To understand the mechanism underlying this model, let us consider a positive pro-
ductivity shock on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). As it is common in other
DSGE models, it will improve the productivity of firms, and it also increases the income
of the households. Clearly, the first eﬀect will lead to a decrease in the probability of firms
becoming bankrupt. Moreover, the increase in household income will lead to an increase
in housing demand, and hence an increase in real estate prices. Because the commercial
real estate is part of the collateral of firms, an increase in real estate prices will further de-
press the probability of firms becoming bankrupt. As a result, less bankruptcy will occur
and resources can be used for productive purposes. In other words, the improvement in
the aggregate TFP will directly (through the firms’ production) and indirectly (through
household income and real estate prices) increase the “debt capacity” of entrepreneurs,
which tends to encourage investment. As a result, aggregate investment and GDP will be
stimulated. Figure 2 summarizes the discussion. Thus, our model provides an unifying
framework in which the real estate market, the imperfect capital market and aggregate
output are closely linked.3 The following sections will formalize these intuitions.
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
3Previous literature such as Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Wang, Young and Zhou (2002), Brown, Cio-
chetti and Riddiough, (2006), among others, focus on the production sector and do not consider the housing
market.
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2.1 Entrepreneurs
When describing entrepreneurial activities it is helpful to outline a sequence of events
within a generic time period in the following manner. (1) A fraction 1 −   ∈ (0 1)
of entrepreneurs die. New entrepreneurs are born in the same measure. Following BGG,
we assume that the dying entrepreneurs consume their net worth before they leave the
scene. The living entrepreneurs are engaged in production and investment activities. (2)
Entrepreneurs use the capital and productive real estate they have accumulated and the
labor they hire to produce output. (3) Repayments are made on loans borrowed in the
previous period. Depending on the returns realized returns on their capital, entrepreneurs
can be either solvent or insolvent. Insolvent entrepreneurs go bankrupt and a bankruptcy
loss is incurred.4 (4) Solvent entrepreneurs sign contracts with financial intermediaries to
purchase additional capital and real estate. The contracts specify the amounts borrowed
and the terms of repayment. The sequence of events is described in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Following BGG, individual entrepreneurs face aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to
their asset returns. Our model diﬀers from BGG in that we distinguish commercial real
estate from physical capital (such as machinery and equipment). Since the price processes
of real estate and capital are diﬀerent, which introduces another channel for productivity
4We assume that bankrupt firms are reorganized and receive an infinitesimal amount of transfer from
the government to maintain a positive amount of net worth. This makes the number of entrepreneurs/firms
constant over time.
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shocks to aﬀect economic performance. Accordingly, we require notation to formalize this
idea. Let        and Ω represent entrepreneur ’s capital stock, commercial real
estate, asset value, and gross return to asset in period , respectively. Then
  = −1 +−1 
and
Ω =    (1)
where −1 (−1) is the price of capital (real estate) prevailing in period  − 1 when
entrepreneur  acquires  ( ),  is the aggregate rate of return on assets from period
−1 to , and  is an idiosyncratic shock specific to entrepreneur . We derive a condition
that determines  below.
We assume that entrepreneur  operates a Cobb-Douglas production technology:
  = 
∙

³

´ ³ ´1−¸ ³´1− ,
where  is labor input,  is aggregate total factor productivity, and  is an idiosyncratic
shock specific to entrepreneur  in period . We assume that  is distributed identically
and independently across entrepreneurs and over time, and has unit mean and c.d.f. (cu-
mulative distribution function)  (). Since all entrepreneurs choose identical ratio of
capital (and real estate) to labor, entrepreneur ’s revenue, net of the labor cost, can be
written as   ( )1−
³

´ ³ ´1−, where    and  denote aggregate capital,
aggregate entrepreneurial real estate, and aggregate output, respectively, where
 = 
h
 ( )1−
i 1−  (2)
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Notice that the term  ( )1−
is like an economy-wide shock from an individual firm
point of view. We assume that the aggregate total factor productivity {} follows an
(1) process:
ln+1 =  ln + +1 (3)
where +1˜ ¡0 2¢.
In period (− 1) entrepreneur  contracts with financial intermediaries on the amount
of borrowing, which along with existing entrepreneurial net worth gives the total value of
entrepreneurial assets to be carried over to period . Given this, the entrepreneur is free
to choose her portfolio, i.e., division of total asset   into  and  , to maximize its
expected return from period − 1 to . Note that it would be equivalent to postulate that
entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries contract in period (− 1) on the optimal bundle
of  and  , in addition to the optimal amount of   . The formulation adopted here
allows us to derive an expression for the return to asset that nests the expression in BGG
as a special case. Given   , the entrepreneur solves the following problem:
max
 
−1
(

() ( )1−
³

´ ³ ´1− + ³1− ´ + ³1− ´
)
(4)
subject to
−1 +−1 ≤   (5)
where  and  are the rates of depreciation for capital and real estate, respectively. The
return on assets includes output produced and the market value of the un-depreciated
portions of entrepreneurial capital and real estate.5 One can show that the Lagrangian
5Note that the expectation in (4) is conditional on period − 1 aggregate information. The term  is
absent within the braces since it is orthogonal to period  aggregate shock and has unit mean.
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multiplier for constraint (5) is identical for all entrepreneurs. By the envelope theorem,
this multiplier, denoted by ˜ , is also the expected rate of return on assets. As it is
common for all entrepreneurs, we call it the aggregate expected rate of return on assets.
Let  denote the realized aggregate return to asset. Thus, we have ˜ = −1 ( ). 
satisfies the following equations:
(The derivations can be found in Appendix A.)
−1
"

() ( )1−

µ 

¶−1
+
³
1− 
´#
= −1 ( )−1 (6)
−1
"

() ( )1−
(1− )
µ 

¶
+
³
1− 
´#
= −1 ( )−1
h
−1 −
³
1− 
´i h−1 − ³1− ´i(1−) =  (1− )1− 
() ( )1−

(7)
Notice that (7) is the result of the maximization of (4). This means that  is what
the entrepreneur would obtain on her capital if she were allowed to optimally divide  
between  and  after observing the period  aggregate shock (but before observing
the idiosyncratic shock). Having defined the aggregate return on assets, entrepreneur ’s
realized idiosyncratic return in period  can be written as Ω =    which is (1).
Importantly, condition (7) nests BGG’s expression for the rate of return on capital as
a special case. Simply setting  = 1 (there is no real estate in the entrepreneurial sector)
yields:
 =  +

¡
1− ¢
−1

as appeared in BGG.
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2.2 Financial Contracting
Entrepreneur , if solvent, signs a contract with a financial intermediary to finance her
investments in productive capital and real estate. Similar to BGG, the entrepreneur’s
financing equation reads:
+1 ++1 = Ω −  ++1 (8)
where +1 is the amount borrowed in period . It is also apparent from (8) that  +1 =
Ω −  + +1. Here  +1 ≡ Ω −  constitutes the entrepreneur’s net worth.
Hence we also have
 +1 =  +1 ++1 (9)
i.e. the asset value equals to the sum of the net worth and borrowing.
We will now analyze the financial contracting decision of an individual entrepreneur.
To ease the notations, we omit the superscript  in this subsection. Given the amount
of entrepreneurial net worth, the contract specifies the amount of borrowing +1 (and
hence the desired asset value +1) and a state-contingent payment schedule. Here we
follow the costly state verification (CSV) tradition of Townsend (1979) in modelling credit
market imperfections.6 We assume that only entrepreneurs can observe the realizations of
the idiosyncratic shock +1 without cost, while financial intermediaries have to expend
a verification cost (interpretable as the cost of bankruptcy, as in Gale and Hellwig, 1985)
to know the true value. The cost is assumed to be proportional to entrepreneurial asset
return Ω+1, the factor of proportionality being  ∈ (0 1).7
6The CSV formulation has been widely used in the literature, including Gale and Hellwig (1985),
Williamson (1986, 1987), Mookherjee and Png (1989), Boyd and Smith (1997), Huybens and Smith (1998),
Smith and Wang (1998), among others.
7For evidence of the “fire-sale discount,” see Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Espen Eckbo and Thorburn
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We follow three steps in analyzing the optimal contract. First, given the amount of
borrowing +1, the optimal form of contract is the standard debt contract, as shown by
Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986). The contract can be characterized by
a nondefault interest rate +1. When the entrepreneur is solvent in period  + 1, i.e.,
Ω+1 ≥ +1+1, she pays the fixed amount +1+1 to the financial intermediary. No
monitoring occurs in this case. Otherwise the intermediary monitors and confiscates all
the entrepreneur’s revenue and incurs verification cost Ω+1. Given the aggregate rate of
return +1, the cutoﬀ level of Ω+1 corresponds to a cutoﬀ value +1 for the idiosyncratic
risk, which satisfies
+1+1+1 = +1+1 (10)
Under the debt contract, the expected payment from the entrepreneur to the financial
intermediary is given by +1+1Γ (+1), where
Γ () ≡ [1−  ()] + ()  (11)
with
 () ≡
Z 
0
 ()  (12)
Recall that  is distributed i.i.d., with the c.d.f.  ()  Thus, [1−  ()] is the probability
that  takes on a value at least as large as  (and when this is the case, the entrepreneur
will be solvent) and  () is the expected value of  provided that  takes on a value
not larger than  (and when this is the case, the entrepreneur will be insolvent) Hence
(2008), among others.
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the entrepreneur’s expected return is +1+1 [1− Γ (+1)], while the intermediary’s
expected return, net of monitoring cost, is given by +1+1 [Γ (+1)−  (+1)].8
Following the procedures of BGG, we now proceed to the second step, which is to
determine the risky loan rate +1. With the presence of aggregate uncertainty, +1
will in general depend on the ex post realization of +1. We assume that entrepreneurs
are risk-neutral while households, who are the owners of the financial intermediaries, are
risk-averse. As BGG argue, this assumption leads to a simple contract structure. Because
the entrepreneur cares only about the mean return on her wealth, she is willing to bear
all the aggregate risk, and thus willing to guarantee the lender a return that is free of
any systematic risk, i.e., conditional on the ex post realization of +1, the borrower
oﬀers a state-contingent non-default payment that guarantees the lender a rate of return
equal in expected value (the expectation taken over the distribution of the idiosyncratic
entrepreneurial risk) to the riskless rate.9 Put diﬀerently, the following equation must
hold for all possible realizations of +1:
[Γ (+1)−  (+1)]+1+1 = +1 (+1 −+1)  (13)
Equation (13) delivers a set of restrictions on +1, one for each realization of +1. With
the existence of aggregate uncertainty, it eﬀectively pins down the risky loan rate +1,
and hence the external finance premium (+1 ≡ +1 −+1), to the aggregate con-
ditions. In particular, the adjustment of the loan rate exhibits a countercyclical pattern.
A realization of +1 that is higher than expected reduces +1 and therefore +1.
8Note that the expected returns of the entrepreneur and the intermediary sum up to
+1+1 [1−  (+1)], where  (+1)+1+1 reflects the deadweight loss, or agency cost, that
arises from informational asymmetry.
9The only residual risk the lender bears arises from the idiosyncratic shock +1, and is thus diversifiable.
Diversification by intermediaries implies that households earn the riskless rate on their savings.
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The optimal amount of borrowing +1 remains to be determined, which is the last
step. By equation (9), this problem corresponds to the desired value of asset +1. The
nondefault interest rate, and hence the cutoﬀ for the idiosyncratic risk +1, will be a
function of the aggregate rate of return on asset +1. The optimal contract solves the
following problem:
max+1{+1}
 ©[1− Γ (+1)]+1+1ª (14)
subject to the constraint that (13) holds for all realizations of +1. In (14) - (13) the
expectation is taken over the distribution of aggregate shocks.
Solving the problem (14), we obtain the demand schedule for asset:
+1 =  ()+1, (15)
where  (·) is an increasing function of the wedge between the expected rate of return to
asset and the safe rate, i.e.,  ≡ +1+1.10 Equation (15) describes the critical link
between entrepreneurial asset demand and financial conditions, as measured by , and by
entrepreneurial net worth, +1. For a detailed description of the solution to the optimal
contract problem, see Appendix B.
2.3 Households
We have completed the description of the entrepreneurs and their financial contract with
the financial intermediaries. Now we turn to the household side of the model economy,
10Notice that at the time , both +1 and the riskfree rate +1 are known. Thus,  ≡ +1+1
can be interpreted as an “ex ante measure” of the credit market condition. In contrast, the EFP that we
uses in the paper, can be interpreted as an “ex post measure.”
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which is relatively standard. The representative household problem maximizes the ex-
pected value of the discounted sum of utility, subject to the budget constraints. Formally,
the household solves the following problem:
max
{+1+1}∞=0
0
∞X
=0

h
ln () +  ln
³

´
+  ln (1− )
i
(16)
subject to  +
h
+1 −
³
1− 
´

i
= + −+1 (17)
where  is consumption,  is housing (residential real estate) stock in period ,  is
hours worked,  is deposit held at financial intermediaries (made at time  − 1),  is
the real wage rate,  is house price, and  is the risk-free real interest rate from −1 to
, which is independent of period  shocks. In (16)  is the discount factor, while  and 
govern the relative importance of housing and leisure, respectively, in the utility function.
Note that we allow  to be stochastic:  represents the shock to preference for housing
in period . This serves as a parsimonious way of generating shocks to house prices (see
also Iacoviello, 2005). For simplicity, we assume that {} follows a mean-reverting (1)
process:
ln +1 − ln ¯ = 
¡
ln  − ln ¯
¢
+ +1 (18)
where +1˜
³
0 2
´
and ¯ is the nonstochastic steady state value of . The first-order
conditions can be easily derived,
 
1−  = (19)
1
 = 
µ
 1+1
¶
+1 (20)
1

 = 
(
1
+1
"+1+1
+1
++1
³
1− 
´#)
 (21)
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Equation (19) is the labor supply condition, (20) is the conventional consumption-saving
Euler equation, while (21) is the Euler equation pertaining to the accumulation of resi-
dential real estate.
2.4 The Equilibrium System
Having described the major players in the model economy, we now follow BGG in “closing
our model” by grouping the equilibrium conditions into three major blocks: “aggregate
demand,” “aggregate supply,” and the evolution of state variables.
(1) Aggregate Demand
The aggregate demand block consists of the entrepreneurial demand for assets (15), the
division of entrepreneurial assets between capital and productive real estate (6), the aggre-
gate rate of return on assets (7), the household consumption-saving Euler equation (20),
the household’s first-order condition for housing, (21), as well as the following conditions:
 =  +  +  +  + 
Z 
0
 ()  (22)
 = (1− ) (23)
 =
∙
Φ0
µ 

¶¸−1
 (24)
 =
∙
Φ0
µ 

¶¸−1
 (25)
where
 ≡  −
"
 + 
R 
0  ()
 −
#
( −)  (26)
Equation (22) is the aggregate resource constraint, where  is aggregate investment
in capital,  is aggregate investment in real estate ( ≡  +  ),  is aggregate
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entrepreneurial consumption. The last term represents bankruptcy costs.11 Equation (23)
links aggregate entrepreneurial consumption to aggregate entrepreneurial equity which, as
shown in (26), is the portion of total asset return left after creditors have been paid at the
risk-free rate and are compensated for the bankruptcy cost. Equation (24) describes the
price of capital. We follow BGG in assuming an adjustment-cost technology for producing
capital. BGG show that this contributes to mimicking the investment behavior observed
in the data. In particular, the amount of new capital produced per unit of existing capital
is an increasing, concave function, represented by Φ (·) of the investment-capital ratio.
Hence the price of capital equals the marginal product of investment. Similarly, equation
(25) is the price of real estate.
(2) Aggregate Supply
The aggregate supply block is composed of the aggregate production function (2) and
the labor market equilibrium condition:
 
1−  = (1− )

  (27)
which is obtained from combining the household labor supply condition (19) and the
entrepreneurs’ optimality condition for labor demand.
(3) Evolution of State Variables
The evolutions of aggregate capital stock, real estate stock, and entrepreneurial net
worth are
+1 = Φ
µ 

¶
 +
³
1− 
´
 (28)
+1 = Φ
µ 

¶
 +
³
1− 
´
 (29)
11Note that, for simplicity, we have assumed that the rates of transformation between residential and
entrepreneurial real estate are in unity.
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and +1 = 
"
 −
Ã
 + 
R 
0  ()
 −
!
( −)
#
 (30)
respectively. In equation (30) the term inside the brackets is simply aggregate entrepre-
neurial equity as defined in (26).12 13
Equations (15) and (30) constitute the building blocks of the so-called “financial ac-
celerator.” Increases in net worth leverage up increases in entrepreneurial assets, which in
turn leads to further increases in entrepreneurial net worth in the future. Furthermore,
equation (13) implies the countercyclicality of  as procyclical asset prices and returns
induce countercyclical default rate and monitoring costs.
3 Quantitative Assessment
3.1 Calibration
To understand the quantitative performance of the model, it is necessary to assign plausible
parameter values. To facilitate the comparison, we follow BGG in assuming that the period
used in the model corresponds to a quarter. On the household side, the parameter values
are fairly standard. The preference parameters include  ¯ and , as in (16).  is set
at 099 to generate a steady state real interest rate of 4% per annum. The value of  is
determined by the criterion that the steady state ratio of the value of house stock to GDP,
12For ease of presentation we have omitted entrepreneurial labor and wage income in the equilibrium
system. BGG introduce these variables to make sure that entrepreneurs always have positive net worth.
Quantitatively, they are negligible.
13Notice that the existence of adjustment cost in (28) means that the next period capital stock +1 is
likely to be less than the sum of aggregate investment  and after-depreciation capital stock of the
current period

1−  For instance, if Φ() =   i.e., a linear function, then by (28), we have +1
=
 

+1−  =  +1−  However, if Φ() =
 
2  i.e., a quadratic function, then by
(28), we have +1 =
 
2+1−  = 
 

+

1−  which is less than  +1− ,
because the investment flow tends to be much smaller than the capital stock,
 

 1
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 , is equal to the corresponding average value in the data, which is roughly 111.14
Following BGG,  is such that the labor supply elasticity is 3, which corresponds to a
steady state value of 025 for labor supply (as a fraction of total time endowment).
On the production side, the share of labor, (1− ), is set at 065. In terms of the share
of the corporate real estate in the total assets, the estimates in the literature appear to be
consistent with one another. For instance, Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983) find that on
average real estate assets constitutes 25 to 40% of the total assets in the United States.
In the sample analyzed by Veale (1989), the figure is around 25%. Du et al. (2008) use
more recent data and find that, on average, property accounts for 30% of a firm’s physical
assets. Accordingly, we set the share of real estate in relation to total entrepreneurial
assets as equal to this number, implying  = 070. In terms of the depreciation rates of
capital and real estate, i.e.,  and  in the model, we follow Jin and Zeng (2004) in
setting them at 166% and 039%, respectively, which correspond to annual rates of 648%
and 154%. There is no clear consensus in the literature about the value of the elasticity
of the price of capital with respect to the investment capital ratio . BGG suggests
that the value should lie within a range from 0 to 050. We set  = 050. This value
generates a standard deviation of capital investment to aggregate output of 229 and a
relative standard deviation of capital price to aggregate output of 115, both of which are
close to their empirical values of 223 and 118, respectively.
Regarding the entrepreneurial sector and the contract problem, we assume that the
idiosyncratic risk, , is distributed log-normally, i.e., ln ∼  ¡−122 2¢. Following
14To calculate this ratio, we use NIPA Table 2.1, “Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets,
Equipment and Software, and Structures by Type”, and Table 1.1.5, “Gross Domestic Product”.
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BGG, we pin down , along with the bankruptcy parameter  and the death rate of
entrepreneurs , jointly using the following three criteria. (1) The steady state external
finance premium ( ) equals the average spread between the prime lending rate and
the 3-month T-bill rate, which is 262% per annum. (2) The quarterly bankruptcy rate
equals 0974% (Fisher, 1999; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). (3) The ratio of entrepreneurial
assets to net worth equals 2.
In the stochastic processes for productivity and house price shocks ((3) and (18)),
the autocorrelation coeﬃcients  and  are set at 095. The disturbances  and 
are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. Their standard deviations  and 
are pinned down jointly with the elasticity of the price of real estate with respect to the
corresponding investment flow-stock ratio  to match a standard deviation of aggregate
output of 170%, a relative standard deviation of house investment to aggregate output
of 511, and a relative standard deviation of house price to aggregate output of 151. It
turns out that  equals 030 a much smaller value than , implying that real estate
investment is subject to less severe adjustment costs than investment in physical capital,
which is consistent with the fact that real estate investment is more volatile than capital
investment over the business cycle.
3.2 Results
This section presents the results. Table 2 reports the business cycle properties of the
log-linearized version of our model. The column labeled “Data” lists the empirical values
of the second moments we are interested in. The model’s performance with regard to both
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of the sources of shock—, i.e. productivity and house price shocks– at work is described in
the “Both shocks” column. It appears that the model matches the data very well in terms
of the volatilities of capital investment, real estate investment, and the prices of capital
and real estate. The contemporaneous correlations between these variables and aggregate
output, except for the price of capital, are roughly in line with the data. In particular, real
estate investment is less procyclical than capital investment, both in the data and in the
model. Our primary interest is the behavior of the external finance premium. It turns out
that the relative standard deviation of the  is 031 in the data and 026 in our model.
Hence, the model explains approximately 84% of the  volatility, given that the asset
prices in our model exhibit similar volatilities to that found in the data. Consistent with
the data, the  appears to be moderately countercyclical in our model (−043 in the
data and −063 in our model).
As can be seen from Table 2a, the most visible inconsistency between the model and
the data is that the actual price of capital is almost acyclic as a business cycle fact, while it
appears strongly procyclical in the model.15 The strong procyclicality of the price of capital
is an important feature of the BGG model. This inconsistency highlights the diﬃculty of
relying on procyclical capital price to generate countercyclical  , as BGG did.16
On the other hand, our model captures the moderate procyclicality of house prices
(the correlation between house prices and the GDP is 049 in the data and 067 in our
model). Thus, the countercyclicality of the EFP and the procyclicality of house prices are
15Data on the price of capital are from “Net Stock Estimates of Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth”
published by Bureau of Economic Analysis.
16We do not attempt to reproduce the acyclicity of the price of capital. It is apparently diﬃcult to do
so within the adjustment-cost framework, which has become a workhorse in the business cycle literature.
We attempt to address this in the future research.
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both replicated successfully by our model.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
To gain a better understanding of how diﬀerent shocks drive the model, the third and
fourth columns of Table 2 presents the performance of the model when only one shock is
operating. When the model is subject solely to the productivity shock, only 55% of the
 volatility can be explained. This is due mainly to the substantial drop in house price
volatility (by 44%) as compared to the both-shock case. The relative volatilities of capital
investment and prices are only slightly less. However, the relative volatility of real estate
investment is substantially smaller (278 versus 511, which is the value in the data). On
the other hand, when we compare the case of the housing demand shock (the last column
of the upper section of Table 1) with the data (the first column of the upper section of
Table 1), we find that the volatility of the EFP, the price of capital goods and real estate,
and the investment in capital goods and real estate, are all significantly over-predicted.
This appears to confirm the importance of including productivity shocks in the model.
The model successfully replicates the countercyclicality of the  , albeit in a stronger
manner. The model with both shocks also slightly over-predicts the cyclicality of real estate
prices and real estate investment. Had the model been driven by only one shock, the lower
section of Table 2 (the third and fourth columns) clearly shows that the counter-cyclicality
of the EFP, and the cyclicality of real estate prices, and real estate investment would all be
significantly exaggerated. Thus, the approach of this model, which is to incorporate both
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technology shocks and house demand shocks appear to be able to capable of capturing the
behavior of the EFP and the real estate market better then some alternative models.
Table 2 provides a summary of the dynamics of the major economic variables when
the system is subject to continuous shocks, described by (3) and (18). We now provide
a visualization of the short run dynamics of the model. Figure 3 shows the impulse
responses to a temporary productivity shock, with a magnitude of one standard deviation
(the shock hits the system at period 5). Aggregate output, prices and investment in
real estate and capital all go up in response to the shock, and interestingly exhibit a
hump-shaped pattern. In contrast, the external finance premium goes down, signifying its
countercyclicality. Figure 3 presents the impulse responses to a temporary, one standard
deviation house demand shock, which induces positive responses in aggregate output, prices
and investment in real estate and capital, together with a negative response in the  .
These impulse responses are broadly consistent with the intuition and the “stylized facts”
identified by the VAR in an earlier section.
[Insert Figure 3, 3 here.]
An important message conveyed by these results is that fluctuation of real estate prices
is a more important influence on the cyclical fluctuation of the external finance premium
than productivity shocks, although the latter is the major driving force considered in the
standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium business cycle models. Moreover, house
price shock is also indispensable for explaining the observed mirror-image relation between
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the cyclicality of house prices and the  . In other words, successfully explaining the
business cycle properties of the  hinges to a large extent on replicating the observed
business cycle properties of house prices. The literature has highlighted the importance of
house price fluctuations in inducing wealth eﬀects on consumption and collateral eﬀects on
consumption and investment spending.17 In this paper, the wealth eﬀect on consumption
is embedded in the representative household problem, as she owns the residential real
estate. To complement the literature, this paper focuses on the collateral eﬀect on the
production side rather than that on the household side. In addition, our paper adds a new
twist into the literature, namely the impact of house price movements on the behavior of
the external finance premium (EFP), and provides an additional propagation mechanism
through the fluctuations of the EFP.
3.3 The Role of Real Estate Price
This section provides further diagnosis of the role real estate prices play in explaining the
volatility of the  First, we attempt to decompose the  into diﬀerent components.
From (10) we have  =  ( − 1) where  ≡ . However, the first-order
conditions for the problem (14)-(13) give rise to the function  =  ( ) (see
Appendix B). Yet the equation (15) implies +1 =  ¡ ¡+1+1¢¢. Putting all
these together, we have

 = 
µ
  
µ
−1
µ

¶¶¶ 


³
−1
³ ´´

³
−1
³ ´´− 1 . (31)
17Among others, see Case et al. (2005) for the wealth eﬀect, and Iacoviello (2005), Chen and Leung
(2008) for the collateral eﬀect.
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We therefore arrive at the following proposition: Given the stochastic process for the risk-
free rate , the stochastic process for the aggregate return on asset  is a suﬃcient
statistic for determining the external finance premium (represented as a fraction of the
risk-free rate). This proposition implies that one needs only look at the behavior of  to
characterize the behavior of , given that the volatility of  is small compared to the
volatility of  . In fact, the procyclicality of  is responsible for the countercyclicality of
. Loglinearizing equation (7), the equation that implicitly determines  , and using
a hat to denote log deviation from the steady state yields
ˆ = 1
h
ˆ − ˆ − (1− ) ˆ
i
+2
h³
1− 
´
ˆ −ˆ−1
i
+3
h³
1− 
´
ˆ −ˆ−1
i

(32)
where
1 =
"

 − ¡1− ¢ + (1− ) − ¡1− ¢
#−1
()−1 
2 = 1 

 − ¡1− ¢ 
3 = 1 (1− )

 − ¡1− ¢ 
Hence we have decomposed the log deviation of the aggregate return on assets into three
components: (1) the log deviation of the marginal product of entrepreneurial asset, viewed
as a composite of capital and real estate, (2) the term involving the price of capital, and
(3) the term involving the price of real estate.
Table 2 presents the decomposition of the volatility of  according to (32). It is
apparent that the marginal product term contributes little to the volatility of the aggregate
return on assets. With productivity shocks and house price shocks both operational, the
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contribution made by house price fluctuations is around 75% of the contribution from
capital price fluctuations, amounting to roughly 44% of the total volatility of the aggregate
return on assets. The relative contribution of house price fluctuations is especially large
when the economy is hit by a house price shock, as house prices exhibit greater volatility
than capital prices. In sum, these results show that, quantitatively, house price fluctuations
are important sources of fluctuations in the aggregate return on assets, and are thus
important factors in accounting for the volatility of the external finance premium.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
3.4 Robustness
Clearly, any quantitative result of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model de-
pends on the values assigned to its parameters. In this session, we examine the changes
in the model’s performance under alternative parameter values. Because the EFP is an
important aspect of this paper and other parameter values have been studied in the pre-
vious literature, this section will focus on the key parameters capable of aﬀecting financial
contracts, namely, the monitoring cost parameter  and the dispersion parameter  for
entrepreneurial idiosyncratic risk. The monitoring cost parameter, , is intended to cap-
ture costs associated with bankruptcy, the value of which appears to be controversial in
the literature. Warner (1977) examines the railroad industry and estimates the cost of
bankruptcy to be about 4 percent. This estimate, however, does not include the direct
costs of financial distress, such as lost revenues and profits. Altman (1984) estimates the
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sum of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs to be about 20 percent of firms’ total assets.
Another measure of bankruptcy costs is obtained by Alderson and Betker (1995) by com-
paring the value of a firm as a going concern with its liquidation value. They calculate
that liquidation costs are, on average, equal to approximately 36 percent of a firm’s as-
sets. The value we take for  in our benchmark simulation (described in the previous
subsection) is 059, which matches the average spread between the prime lending rate and
the 3-month T-bill rate (262% per annum). This value is clearly larger than the direct
estimates suggested in the literature. However, when we match the model’s steady state
 with the historical average of the spread between the prime lending rate and the
3-month commercial paper rate (190% per annum), the value for  turns out to be 040,
which is close to the estimate of Alderson and Betker.
Table 3 compares the model’s performance under diﬀerent values for the monitoring
cost parameter , holding all other parameter values unchanged. It is clear that lower
values of  and hence lower steady state values of  , are associated with lower 
volatilities. When  = 040, the relative standard deviation of the  drops to 68% of
the empirical value. When  takes the value (020) reported by Altman (1984), the relative
 volatility further drops to 45% of the empirical value. However, that fluctuations
in real estate prices contribute more than fluctuations in capital prices to the volatility
of the aggregate return on assets, and hence the external finance premium, is a robust
feature of our model. In fact, the relative contribution from real estate price fluctuations
increases with smaller value of . The other features of our model that remain robust
include: first, that the  is moderately countercyclical and, second, that compared to
productivity shocks, house demand shocks induce larger relative volatilities in the  ,
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and larger relative contributions to  volatility from fluctuations in real estate prices.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Next, we look at the eﬀects of varying the dispersion parameter  for entrepreneurial
idiosyncratic risk while holding all other parameters fixed at their benchmark values, the
results of which are listed in Table 4. A larger dispersions of entrepreneurial idiosyncratic
risk is associated with larger relative volatility of the  . When  = 050, the model
exactly replicates the relative standard deviation in the data.18 It appears that the mag-
nified eﬀect of house price shocks, rather than productivity shocks, is the reason for this.
The contribution from real estate price fluctuations, relative to capital price fluctuations,
does not change much with variations in . Finally, the moderate countercyclicality of
the  remains a robust feature of the model. Overall, the principal conclusions of this
paper appear to be robust to alternative parameter values.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
4 Conclusions
This paper attempts to marry two diﬀerent literatures relating to aggregate economic
activities. The first reflects the increasing awareness that the housing market plays an
18A value of 050 for  corresponds to a steady state value for  of 404% per annum, an asset-net
worth ratio of 144, and a quarterly bankruptcy rate of 145%.
28
important role in the aggregate economy, with the wealth eﬀect of consumption, and the
collateral eﬀect on the household side being highlighted recently.19 The second concerns
how the imperfect capital market may aﬀect the aggregate economy. 20 This paper be-
gins with an empirical observation that a positive real house price shock indeed lowers
the external finance premium and stimulates nonresidential investment and a real increase
in GDP (see the impulse response in Figure 1). The paper then proceeds to introduce
residential and corporate real estate into the BGG model, which is regarded as a stan-
dard vehicle for bringing the imperfect capital market into business cycle analysis. The
quantitative theoretical model is calibrated to match certain observed features of the U.S.
aggregate economy, including the relative volatility of the external finance premium, the
relative price of housing and capital, as well as the levels of investment in real estate and
capital. Interestingly, the stylized model captures the moderate counter-cyclicality of the
external finance premium and the moderate cyclicality of house prices. Further analysis
shows that the fluctuations in real estate prices account for nearly half of the volatility
of the aggregate return on assets, which in turn significantly drives the movement of the
external finance premium. The robustness checks also confirm that house demand shocks
and house prices fluctuations indeed account for an important share of the volatility of
the aggregate output.
Clearly, future research can extend in many directions. First, more careful empirical
studies of the relationship between the credit market and the real estate market, and their
influence on aggregate output are needed. Second, the model presented in this paper is
19Among others, see Leung (2004), Leung and Quigley (2007) for a review of the literature.
20Again, see BGG for a review of that literature.
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very stylized and can be extended to include other important features, including nominal
rigidities, government spending and tax, as well as monetary policy.21 In addition, the real
estate market is presented in a highly simplified manner and can be extended to incorporate
other realistic aspects of the market, such as securitization. Eﬀorts are currently underway
in these research directions.
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Table 1. Sequence of Events Relevant to Entrepreneurs with Period 
1. Begin period 
2. Death and birth of entrepreneurs
3. Aggregate shocks realize
4. Idiosyncratic shocks realize
5. Production using labor, capital , and real estate 
6. Repayment on previous debt  or bankruptcy
7. Contract: borrowing +1 + net worth +1 =⇒ total asset value +1
8. Purchase of capital +1 and real estate +1 using +1
9. Move to period + 1
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Table 2a. Business cycle properties of the model
Relative volatilities to real GDP
Data Both shocks Productivity shock House Demand shock
 0.31 0.26 (0.03) 0.17 (0.01) 0.76 (0.01)
 1.51 1.51 (0.15) 0.84 (0.00) 4.98 (0.07)
 1.18 1.15 (0.04) 1.05 (0.00) 2.06 (0.02)
 5.11 5.11 (0.51) 2.78 (0.01) 16.56 (0.23)
 2.23 2.29 (0.07) 2.09 (0.01) 4.11 (0.05)
Correlations with real GDP
Data Both shocks Productivity shock House Demand shock
 −0.43 −0.63 (0.07) −0.74 (0.01) −0.89 (0.02)
 0.49 0.67 (0.08) 1.00 (0.00) 0.78 (0.04)
 0.06 0.97 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00)
 0.47 0.67 (0.08) 1.00 (0.00) 0.77 (0.04)
 0.75 0.97 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00)
Note: The relative volatility of the variable  is std()/std( ).  : real GDP,  :
external finance premium, : house price, : price of capital, : investment in real
estate, : investment in capital, : consumption.     and  are logged. 
is in percent per annum. All series are HP-filtered with the smoothing parameter set to
1600. The statistics reported are means over 500 simulations with standard deviations in
the parentheses.
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Table 2b. Decomposition of the volatility of the aggregate return to asset
Both shocks Productivity shock House Demand shock
Return to asset 1.56 1.14 1.08
Marginal product 0.07 0.06 0.02
Capital price 0.91 0.78 0.48
Real estate price 0.68 0.33 0.61
Note: “Return to asset” refers to ˆ , “marginal product” refers to 1
h
ˆ − ˆ − (1− ) ˆ
i
,
“capital price” refers to 2
h¡
1− ¢ ˆ −ˆ−1i, and “real estate price” refers to 3×h¡
1− ¢ ˆ −ˆ−1i as in equation (32). All series are HP-filtered with the smoothing
parameter set to 1600 before their standard deviations (expressed in percentage terms)
are computed. The statistics reported are means over 500 simulations. The standard
deviations over these simulations are all virtually zero and are thus not reported.
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Table 3. Sensitivity to the monitoring cost parameter
Both shocks Productivity shock House Demand shock
Relative  = 059 0.26 0.17 0.76
volatility  = 040 0.21 0.13 0.75
of   = 020 0.14 0.09 0.79
Relative  = 059 0.75 0.42 1.27
contribution  = 040 0.77 0.48 1.29
from   = 020 0.82 0.60 1.39
Correlation  = 059 −0.63 −0.74 −0.89
of   = 040 −0.63 −0.82 −0.80
with   = 020 −0.59 −0.94 −0.29
Note: Relative volatility of  refers to the standard deviation of  divided by
the standard deviation of  . Relative contribution from  refers to the standard devi-
ation of the 3
h¡
1− ¢ ˆ −ˆ−1i term as in equation (32) divided by the standard
deviation of the 2
h¡
1− ¢ ˆ −ˆ−1i term.
Table 4. Sensitivity to dispersion of entrepreneurial idiosyncractic risks
Both shocks Productivity shock House Demand shock
Relative  = 050 0.31 0.15 1.07
volatility  = 029 0.26 0.17 0.76
of   = 010 0.20 0.17 0.47
Relative  = 050 0.82 0.46 1.15
contribution  = 029 0.75 0.42 1.27
from   = 010 0.70 0.46 1.76
Correlation  = 050 −0.51 −0.74 −0.83
of   = 029 −0.63 −0.74 −0.89
with   = 010 −0.73 −0.76 −0.85
Note: Relative volatility of  refers to the standard deviation of  divided by
the standard deviation of  . Relative contribution from  refers to the standard devi-
ation of the 3
h¡
1− ¢ ˆ −ˆ−1i term as in equation (32) divided by the standard
deviation of the 2
h¡
1− ¢ ˆ −ˆ−1i term.
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Appendix
A. Derivation of the Aggregate Return on Asset ((6), (7))
Consider the entrepreneur’s asset division problem (4)-(5). Let ˜ be the Lagrangian
multiplier on (5), which is also the expected return to capital from period (− 1) to .
Then the first-order conditions with respect to  and  are
−1
"

() ( )1−

µ 

¶−1
+
³
1− 
´#
= ˜−1
−1
"

() ( )1−
(1− )
µ 

¶
+
³
1− 
´#
= ˜−1
These two conditions can be rewritten as
−1
"

() ( )1−

µ 

¶−1
+
³
1− 
´#
= −1 ( )−1
−1
"

() ( )1−
(1− )
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¶
+
³
1− 
´#
= −1 ( )−1
where the realized return to capital,  , is defined by

() ( )1−

µ 

¶−1
+
³
1− 
´
= −1

() ( )1−
(1− )
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
¶
+
³
1− 
´
= −1
which is (6). The interpretation of  is what the entrepreneur would obtain on her capital
if she were allowed to optimally divide  between  and  after observing the period aggregate shock (but before observing the idiosyncratic shock). The latter two equations
imply that  satisfies (7),h
−1 −
³
1− 
´i h−1 − ³1− ´i(1−) =  (1− )1− 
() ( )1−

Apparently  is independent of individual entrepreneurs’ characteristics.
B. Solution to the Optimal Contract Problem
Let
+1 ≡ +1+1 ,  ≡
 ¡+1¢
+1 , e+1 ≡ 
+1
 ¡+1¢ ,
39
and Υ (+1) ≡ 1− Γ (+1) + +1 [Γ (+1)−  (+1)] ,
where +1 is the Lagrangian multiplier on (13), one for each realization of +1. The
first-order conditions for problem (14)-(13) are then
+1 : Γ0 (+1)− +1 £Γ0 (+1)− 0 (+1)¤ = 0
+1 :  [Υ (+1) e+1 − +1] = 0
+1 : [Γ (+1)−  (+1)] e+1+1 − (+1 − 1) = 0
The first-order condition with respect to +1 defines a function  (+1), with 0 (+1) 
0. Then the first-order condition with respect to +1 implicitly defines a function +1 = (e+1 +1), with +1  0 and +1+1  0. Substituting the first and
third first-order conditions into the first-order condition for +1, we have
 {Υ ( (e+1 +1)) e+1 −  ( (e+1 +1))} = 0
This equation implicitly defines the function +1 =  ()  0 ()  0  (1) = 1.
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Impulse responses
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Figure 1. VAR impulse responses 
 
   Note: GDPQ refers to the log of real GDP, PH refers to log real OFHEO house price (deflated by implicit price deflator for personal consumption 
expenditure), EFP refers to the extent finance premium which is the spread between the prime lending rate and the 3-month T-bill rate, and NRI 
refers to log real nonresidential investment. The sample period is 1975Q1-2008Q2. The number of lags, which equals four, is determined by Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The plots are in terms of percentage deviations. The confidence bands are 
computed by Monte Carlo method (5000 draws). The blue lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The first column presents responses to GDPQ 
shock, the second PH shock, the third EFP shock, and the forth NRI shock. 
  
Figure 2: An illustration on how the real estate market, imperfect capital market and the aggregate 
output are related. 
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Figure 3a. Impulse responses to one standard deviation productivity shock. 
 
Note: Y: aggregate output, EFP: external finance premium, Qh: house price, Qk: capital price, Ih: house 
investment, Ik: capital investment. All plots are in terms of percentage deviations from the 
corresponding steady states, except that EFP is in terms of basis point deviation. 
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Figure 3b. Impulse responses to one standard deviation house demand shock. 
 
Note: Y: aggregate output, EFP: external finance premium, Qh: house price, Qk: capital price, Ih: house 
investment, Ik: capital investment. All plots are in terms of percentage deviations from the 
corresponding steady states, except that EFP is in terms of basis point deviation. 
 
